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580 

'y 1 SPEECH 



P 



Mk,NILES, OF CONNECTICUT, 



ON THE 



OREGON QUESTION. 



DELIVERED 



IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES. 



THURSDAY, MARCH 19, 1846. 



WASHINGTON; 

PRINTED AT THE UNION OFFIkT 

1846. 



SPEECH. 



On tfu rttolution giving the twelve months* notict Jor the termination of the 
joint eceupanoy of the Oregon territory. 



Mr. NILES roM and said — 

Mr. PRStnoEirr: It was not his purpose, said Mr. 
N., to occupy much of the time of the Senate in the 
remarks he had to submit on this subject; he spoke 
of the general subject of dispute concerning what is 
called the Oregon territory, rather than the particu- 
lar bill under consideration; yet, considering its ex- 
tensive nature, and various ramifications, he was 
admonished not to preface his remarks by any al- 
lusion to their brevity, lest he should add another to 
the many examples that such an introduction was 
a sure indication of a long speech. In what he 
should have to say, it was not his intention to dis- 
cuss with a view to demonstrate or strengthen it — 
the title of the United States to that territory in any 
of its phases; nor did he propose to examine the Brit- 
ish claims, although he might allude to the grounds 
of them and their extent, as compared with the 
claims of the United States. These topics had been 
fully and ably debated here and elsewhere, and 
probably all had been said that could be offered to 
any advantage. Besides, he did not regard the dis- 
cussion of these disputed topics as having a very 
important bearing on the main question, which was, 
how this dispute between the two countries could 
be settled satisfactorily to the United States? We 
may convmce ourselves, and our own people, that 
our title to the whole of that territory is clear and 
unquestionable; but, if our facts and arguments were 
as "strong as proof of holy writ," would they con- 
vince the government of Great Britain or the peo- 
ple of England? Will they read our arguments; 
and if they do so, will they read them with that 
impartiality which will admit of conviction? And, 
if in any sense convinced, would it not be the case 
ofa person "convinced against his will, who re- 
mains of the same opinion still." 

Nor did Mr. N. propose to discuss either posi- 
tively or relatively the power and ability of the two 
countries, to sustain and prosecute a war — a ques- 
tion which, in his judgment, had little to do with 
this controversy in the present stage of it — a ques- 
tion which it would be time enough to discuss when 



a rupture between the two countries should become 
inevitable, or the danger of it much more imminent 
than he believed it to be at present. Nor would he 
indulge in that fruitful topicof declamation, the calam- 
ities of war either abstractly, or in respect to what 
might be peculiar to this country; as however great 
the evils of war might be, he did not regard that as a 
very sound reason why we should not insist on such 
a settlement of this dispute as should recognise our 
just and reasonable rights. There were some other 
things that he would not bring into this debate. If 
he did not attempt to establish our title, he certainly 
would not labor to prove that the United States had 
no title at all. Nor, if we had, would he argue that 
we were so weak as compared with Great Britain, 
that it was the part of wisdom not to insist on our 
rights, but to secure peace at any sacrifice. And he 
would not repeat what others had done, and what 
he had witnessed with profound regret — he would 
not bnng into this debate the resolution of the Balti- 
more convention either as proof that our title is clear 
and unquestionable, or as evidence of public opin- 
ion on this subject, nor as an argument to influence 
our action. Sir, that resolution was unauthorized. 
It was a subject with which that convention should 
not have intermeddled. It was, he believed, the first 
and certainly a dangerous example of giving a party 
character to a question connected with our foreign 
relations — a dispute with a foreign power which 
might result in war? And supposing such a result 
should follow, would it not give occasion for all who 
might be dissatisfied with the war to say that it had 
been brought upon the country by the proceedings 
ofa party convention, and that the war consequently 
was a mere party war? When he had heard frona 
some of his friends this ill-advised resolution press- 
ed into this debate, he had been ready to exclaim, 
as he now did, introduce any other topic, press any 
other argument, but, in the name of Heaven, spare 
us, save us from an argument drawn from the reso- 
lution of a party convention, on a question involv- 
ing the momentous issue of peace or war. 
At the coiflmcncement of the present session, said 



Mr. N., the President, in discharge of his constitu- 
tional duty, communicated to Congress the corres- 
pondence which had taken place between the Secre- 
tary of State anil the British plenipotentiary in re- 
gard to the disputed claims of the two countries to 
the territory on the northwest coast of America, and 
in his message gave a history of the negotiations 
which have taken place on that subject since their 
commencement in 1818. He also recommended 
certain measures to the consideration of Con- 
gress for the maintenance of our rights. Among 
these measures, and what seems to be regard- 
ed as first in order, was the necessary authori- 
ty to terminate the convention of 1818, renewed and 
continued by that of 1827. This matter having 
been brought before Congress, the first question 
aeemed to be, whether it was proper for us to do 
anything in relation to it? Whether it was best to 
act at all, or leave it where it is— in the hands of the 
Executive — for him to dispose of? And if it is 
deemed advisable to do anything, the next question 
is, whether it is expedient to pass the bill under con- 
sideration for abrogating the convention? What he 
had to say on this subject was intended to be of a 
practical nature, and with a view to results, it not 
being his intention to discuss disputed abstract ques- 
tions of right. Several senators who have address- 
ed the Senate have expressed much doubt whether 
they could vote for the authority to give the notice 
for terminating the convention. They said that 
would depend on circumstances on what might be 
developed in the course of the debate, on what use 
was to be made of the power to give the notice, and 
what measures might be likely to follow it. Such 
he under.-!tood to be the views of the senator from 
South Carolina, [Mr. Calhoun,] and the senator 
from Maine, [Mr. Evans.] The last named senator, 
said that if there was even a remote probability that 
authorizing the notice would give rise to other meas- 
ures which might disturb the peaceful relations be- 
tween the two countries, it behooved us to pause, 
and to act with great caution. To this he certainly 
did net object; he thought himself, that before we 
took the first step it was proper and the part of wis- 
dom to look ahead and see what other measures it 
might become necessary to adopt, how far we may 
be required to go, and where we can stop, and what 
condition we shall be in in regard to this controversy 
at that time. This measure might be unobjection- 
able in itself, but if it necessarily leads to others 
which would embarrass the subject, and tend to in- 
volve the country in war, that might be a sufficient 
objection to adopting it. Some gentlemen have 
considered this measuae as a peaceful one; others as 
:hostile, not because it was so in itself, but because 
^it would necessarily lead to measures of a hostile 
land forcible nature. His friend from Michigan, 
f[Mr. Cass,] if he had understood him, seemed 
:to regard giving the notice to abrogate the conven- 
tion as the first in the series of measures which 
would result in taking forcible possession of the dis- 
puted territory. If you abrogate the treaty, then ex- 
tend your laws and jurisdiction over the territory, 
and attempt to dipossess the British settlers there, 
and if Great Britain should defend her subjects, as 
he thinks she probably would, why, then, war be- 
comes inevitable. Nothing, perhaps, can be more 
conclusive. If the premises are admitted, no one, he 
presumed, could deny the conclusion. But are 
these measures the natural consequence of abroga- 
ting the treaty? Are they a necessary result of it? 
if we give the notice, shall we be boihid to follow 



up that measure by all or any of the measures he 
had alluded to? Mr. N. thought not. He did not 
consider the notice as the first of a series of meas- 
ures for a forcible occupation of the disputed terri- 
tory. We shall be left entirely at liberty to pursue 
such measures as we please, pacific or otherwise, 
after abrogating the convention. There is nothing, 
therefore, in this objection. What reason is there 
opposed to passing this resolution? Can any other 
or better measure be proposed.' — or is it deemed the 
wisest policy to do nothing? To those who may 
think so, he had a word to say; he wished to know 
how those who took this position expected that this 
long and perplexing controversy was to be brought 
to a close. All must admit the importance of its 
being terminated; it had a tendency to disturb the 
harmony of the two countries. Do they look to 
time to bring about an adjustment? And how much 
time will be required? The negotiation has been 
pending for nearly thirty years, and we are no near- 
er a settlement than when it commenced. If in 
thirty years we have made no progress, how long 
will it take to obtain a recognition of our rights? 
But, it has been asked, why shall we abrogate the 
convention? What shall we gain by it? One object 
might be gained; it might favor negotiation, and 
conduce to a settlement. This, we had reason to 
believe, was, in part, the motive of the President in 
asking for the authority to annul the treaty; he be- 
lieved that it would favor negotiation; and is it not 
wise to strengthen the arm of the Executive, and give 
him every facility and advantage to bring this dis- 
pute to a close? The President, by the constitution, 
is entrusted with the power of conducting negotia- 
tions, and of adjusting disputes with foreign pow- 
ers; and he has asked for this authority, supposing 
it would bean advantage in the settlement of this 
controversy; and this (said Mr. N.) is a sufficient 
reason for giving it to him, unless there are strong 
objections to doing it. But there are other and sound 
reasons for terminatinj the convention — reasons in- 
dependent of its influence, favorable to a settle- 
ment of this dispute by negotiation. The arrange- 
ment was never a beneficial one to the United States; 
and if it ever was, it has ceased to be so now. He 
disagreed entirely with the senator from South Caro- 
lina [Mr. Calhoun] who said this convention had 
been important to us; that it had established «\xr 
rights, and that without it, we should have had to 
abandon them, or to have sustained them by force. 
He did not understand how this treaty has sustain- 
ed our rights, when, profesedly, it had nothing to do 
with the rights of the parties to it; it left those in 
abeyance; its only object was to provide for a tem- 
porary use of the country, and to prevent disputes 
among those engaged in the fur-trade. And how 
had it effected this object? Why, by driving our 
traders entirely out of that trade, as had been shown 
by the senator from Missouri, [Mr. Benton,] and 
securing a monopoly of it to the Hudson Bay Com- 
pany. But this treaty arrangement, had obstructed 
the settlement of the country by our citizens; it was 
inconsistent with the settlement of the country, and 
as this was our object, it became important to re- 
move the embarrassment which this treaty inter- 
posed. He regarded the act of ParUament of 1821, 
extending British laws over the country, so far as 
respects her own subjects, a violation of the spirit of 
the convention. That act had contributied to the 
settlement of the country by British subjects, if it 
was not so intended. And the Puget Sound Com- 
pany, with a large capital, had been incorporated for 



the express purpose of encouraging the settlement 
and cultivation of the country. But our citizens 
had been discouraged from settling there, because 
our laws and jurisdiction, did not reach them for 
their protection. 

As matters now are, the British have every advan- 
tage; they have a monopoly of the fur-trade, and in- 
ducements for settlement. Let us, then, put an end 
to this unequal state of things. And let us see what 
condition we shall be in, when the treaty obligations 
are disolved. We shall be restored to the condition 
we were in before the treaty took effect, and put into 
the exclusive possession of a part of the territory, 
and possess our rights to the whole, unfettered and 
unembarrassed, and be at liberty to enforce them as 
we may see fit. The senator from Georgia, [Mr. 
Berrien,] is mistaken, in supposing that the British 
will be in possession of two-thirds of the territory; 
she will not have the exclusive possession of any 
portion of it. The right of possession, like the title 
and jurisdiction, will be in dispute, and that party 
will have the advantage, which possesses the great- 
est facility for settling the country; and that will be 
the United States. We have settlements much 
nearer to it; and our citizens are more hardy and ad- 
venturous in effecting settlements in a new country 
in advance of civilization. The discovery of the 
South Ptiss, has removed the mountain barrier, and 
opened the country to the hardy enterprise of our 
citizens, particularly in the great valley of the 
Mississippi. Should there be no adjustment, 
the settlements by both parties will be attended by 
some embarrassment, but no greater on our part 
than on that of Great Britain. They have extended 
their laws over their subjects, and we can extend 
our laws over our citizens. This will be an embar- 
rassing state of things — a double jurisdiction over 
the same country, but not essentially different from 
what it is at present, except that the parties will be 
on an equality in respect to rights and protection, 
and nov/ the British have the advantage. 

There was, in his judgment, no well-founded ob- 
jections to abrogating the convention, and strong 
reasons in its favor. But a question has been raised 
as to the farm of the notice; and there are several 
forms proposed, in the shape of amendments. Some 
had spoken of a qualified and an absolute notice; 
but there could be no qualified notice; the notice 
must be such as to terminate the treaty; it must do 
that, or it amounts to nothing, and it can do no 
more than that. But the notice may be accompa- 
nied by a declaration respecting negotiation, and 
there were several resolutions of that kind. He 
considered a simple notice — and as nearly in the 
words of the treaty as possible — as the most proper 
and dignified; and there would be no propriety in 
connecting any resolution or declaration of any de- 
scription with it, was it not that in the debate the 
notice had been regarded by some as a hostile 
measure, or as the first in a series of measures, for 
the forcible occupation of the territory. In view of 
this, it might be proper, and certainly was not ob- 
jectionable, to accompany the notice with a declara- 
tion that it was not intended to foreclose, or in any 
way interfere with a settlement of the controversy 
by negotiation. The resolution from the House 
amounted to no more than this, and met his approba- 
tion; and, with his present views, he should vote 
for the House resolutions, and against all amend- 
ments. In regard to the amendment offered by the 
senator from Geoi^ia, [Mr. Colquitt,] he thought 
that went too far, and was too supplicating. He 



would not accompany the resolution for abrogating; 
the convention with another resolution, which 
seemed to say that we are afraid of what we are 
doing. He would not say to Great Brifam we think 
we have a right, and think it is for our interest to- 
annul the convention, but are almost afraid to do itj 
we hope you will not be offended; we are ex- 
tremely anxious to compromise the dispute on 
almost any terms, to quiet the minds of our 
people, who wouhl be alarmed at the very 
thought of war. There was little dignity in this 
supplicating tone, this begging for a compro- 
mise; and he thought there could be nothing gained 
by it. 

But, said Mr. IN., the main question is, as alj 
must admit, what policy on our part is best calcula- 
ted to bring about a satisfactory adjustment of this 
long-.3tanding controversy.' We wish it settled; but 
on terms containing a reasonable recognition of our 
rights. We differ as to the extent of our rightsj, : 
but all must agree that it is important that the dis- 
pute be settled, if it can be, on terms reasonably 
satisfactory, without disturbing the peace of the 
country. If we abrogate the treaty, there will be 
three ways in which this dispute may terminate. 
First, by negotiation and compromise; second, by 
one of the parties taking forcible possession of the ' 
disputed territory; and thirdly, by leaving it to time ' 
and the settlement of the country. The first he re- 
garded as the most desirable, anc', a;; long as there is 
any prospect that our object could be attained in 
that way, it v/ould seem to be our true policy to 
adapt our measures to this end. He believed that 
this dispute could be settled by negotiation, and 
therefore regarded it as important that Congress and 
the Executive should occupy a position favorable to 
such a result. We should .■stand where we ever 
have stood in regard to this controversy. We have 
from the first asserted a title or claim to the whole 
territory; but have recognised this claim to be in 
di.spute, and have admitted that Great Britain may 
have certain rights in the territory. This has been 
our position. Shall we adhere to it.' or shall we 
take a new position, and not only assert a claim to 
the whole territory, but deny all right,'? to Great 
Britain, and thus exclude ail hopes of settling the 
dispute by negotiation.' He regarded it as unwise 
and unsafe to assume such a position. He did not 
believe it prudent or wise to insist «jn our claim to- 
ils utmost extent, attended, as all must admit it to- 
be, with some doubts and difficulties. If we insist - 
on having the whole, we may lose all, besides in- 
curring the hazard of involving the country in war. 
Have we any reason to suppose that Great Britain 
will yield to our claims to this extent, and relinquish 
her whole pretensions? It would be the greatest 
folly to believe this. If we insist on a claim to the 
whole territory, we must expect to defend it by- 
force; and what right have we to assume that we 
shall be successful in such an attempt' As he had 
already said, he would not discuss the means or 
power of Great Britain or of the United States to 
sustain and prosecute a war. Both were powerful; 
and who could foresee the result' In insisting on 
all, we may lose all, besides bringing on the coun- 
try the calamities of war. A moderate but firm 
course, he thought the best. He would not push 
our claims to the utmost extent, but would insist on 
a recognition of our reasonable rights. This had 
been our policy hitherto, and he saw no reason to 
change it. There was not only hazard in doing it, 
but there was difficulty arising fronn our own acts. 



We have repeatedly recognised certain rights in 
Great Britain, and have proposed to compromise 
the dispute. How can we now deny all rights in 
her, and insist on a claim to the whole territory? 
What reason can we assign for this change in our 
position? Have we acquired any new rights since 
the renewal of the convention in 1827? We had 
acquired the Spanish title previous to that period. 
In what way is our title strengthened or better now, 
than it was at that time? Can we even say that we 
were ignorant of our just claims, and have obtained 
new light in regard to them? Shall we not expose 
ourselves to the charge of asserting a more exten- 
sive claim now than we have heretofore, merely be- 
cause we are more able to defend iL' Shall we suf- 
fer it to be supposed that our claims increase with 
the growing resources and power of the country? 
He did not contend that the faith of the country 
was pledged to an adjustment on the basis of the 
forty-ninth degree of north latitude; the propositions 
we have made were offered in the spirit of compro- 
mise, and did not amount to a limitation of our 
claims, or an admission that we had no claim be- 
yond forty-nine. What he contended was, that in 
the negotiations oh the subject, whilst asserting a 
claim to the whole, we have conceded that there 
-was so much doubt or difficulty attending our claim, 
that we had been willing to concede a part to secure 
the recognition of the rest. This was the position 
we have occupied, and he thought we could not, 
with propriety, change it, without some good rea- 
rsons for doing so. The character of our govern- 
ment and country for a respect for justice, and for 
fairness and moderation in its transactions with 
other nations, is of some importance, and should 
not be lightly hazarded. It is sound policy to main- 
tain a position in this controversy so clear- 
ly just and reasonable as to secure the appro- 
val of other powers; and in case it should 
unfortunately result in disturbing the peace of 
ithe two countries, we might then justly expect the 
sympathy if not the assistance of some of them. 
Should a war follow, we must abide the verdict of 
the civilized world, and should endeavor to secure 
the good o(<inion of other powers, and particularly 
of our ancient ally, France. This is one reason in 
favor of moderation in asserting our rights. But a 
more important one is, to secure the approval of our 
own citizens, and unite public opinion in favor of 
our measures, especially in the event of our being 
compelled to assert our rights by force. The 
strength of this country in war, and the chance of 
success in the struggle will depend mainly on the 
harmony of public opinion in regard to the measure, 
and the necessity of it. If all hearts and hands are 
united, we shall be strong, and shall have reason to 
hope for success. But if we are plunged into war 
with divided councils, and a divided public opinion, 
what shall we have to expect? 

The senator from Illinois, [Mr. Breese,] has as- 
sumed that in a war for the whole of Oregon, our 
whole people will be united. He says, we shall have 
no peace party; although he admits a war would de- 
stroy our foreign trade. Sir, I fear the senator would 
find himself mistaken, dreadfully mistaken. No 
peace party! Why, a peace party is already form- 
ing in advance; who can be so blind as not to see 
this? Who has not witnessed the elements of a 
peace party already developed, and which, in due 
time, would be organized throughout the Union? 
And it would not be a peace party confined to one 
section, as during the late war; not confined to the 



North, but extending to the South, if not over the 
whole Union. The strong elements of this party 
will be found in the commercial interest, which 
would be most seriously affected. That is an in- 
terest peculiarly sensitive; you cannot touch it with- 
out an excitement, if not the most determined op- 
position to your measures. It was a great and 
powerful interest, active and efficient, and would ex- 
ert an influence greater than any other, according to 
the numbers engaged in it. It possessed a large 
share of the capital of the country, controlled a large 
portion of the money of the country, and em- 
ployed no small amount of its labor. It is a 
formidable and dangerous interest, to array against 
the government in time of war; it is naturally 
favorable to peace, and will not acquiesce in the 
interruption of its pursuits, except for causes 
which imperiously demand it. It can do much, as 
it did during the last war to derange and break down 
the finances of the government. Who would wish 
to see re-enacted the scenes which occurred during 
the period to whrch he had referred? The country 
struggling with a powerful nation, and the arm of 
the government paralyzed by the spirit of disaffec- 
tion and faction? If we are to be involved in war 
from this controversy, we must be careful that we 
do all that could reasonably be expected to avoid 
such a calamity, so as to satisfy all classes, and, as 
far as possible, the whole people, that our govern- 
ment has been reasonable, and acted with modera- 
tion in the assertion of our rights; that it has yielded 
all that it could yield, without giving up the ac- 
knowledged rights of the country, and compromit- 
ting its honor. 

Mr. President, I have endeavored lo point out the 
position which the government of the United States 
has occupied, and ought to continue to occupy, in 
regard to this controversy. But it has been claimed, 
or assumed in this debate, that the President has 
abandoned this position, and that he now intends to 
assert a claim to the whole territory, and yield to 
no adjustment upon any other basis. It was cer- 
tainly a matter of regret, that the position of the 
Executive, upon a question so important as this, 
should be a matter of doubt, and a subject of dis- 
pute among his friends here. He had witnessed the 
disputations on this point with pain; and for his own 
part, he believed there was no just grounds for 
them. We can know nothing, sir, of the opinions 
or purposes of the Executive, but from his official 
acts and communications. It would, in his judg- 
ment, be highly improper for the President, o» a sub- 
ject like this, to communicate his private opinionaor 
intentions to any one; and he did not beHeve 
that he had done so, and for this opinion he had 
the highest authority. The position occupied by 
the President, and what may be his future course in 
relation to this dispute, can only be known, or 
judged of, from his official acts — from what he has 
done, what he has recommended, and the opinions 
and purposes he has officially explained. And if 
we look to this source, and this alone, he thought' 
there ought to be no great doubt on this subject. [ 
Has the President expressed himself with so much 
obscurity that he cannot be understood? Or is it 
supposed that he has intentionally concealed his 
thoughts in dark and ambiguous language, or by 
conflicting and contradictory statements? For his 
part, he found no difficulty in understanding the 
message, or in learning from it the President's posi- 
tion. After giving a history of previous negotia- 
tions, he informs us of the proposition he had offer- 



od for the adjustment of this dispute, which, not be- 
iftg accepted, was withdrawn. But he does not in- 
form us that be has changed his ground; that he 
shall hereafter decline all negotiation, or, what 
would be the same thing, negotiate on no other ba- 
sts than a recognition of our claims to the whole ter- 
ritory in dispute. He does not say this; nor does 
he say anything that can by any forced construction 
be tortured into a meaning that he has assumed 
any such position. A remark of his seems to have 
been misunderstood. He says the proposition 
which had been offered and not accepted was with- 
drawn, "and our title to the whole territory assert- 
ed and maintained, as is believed, by irrefragable 
facts and arguments." This is not the expression 
of any opinion, or of any purpose, as to the future, 
but relates to what had been done; it refers to the 
la3t letter of our Secretary of State, which asserts, 
and attempts to maintain our title to the whole ter- 
ritory by irrefragable facts and arguments. The 
only opmion he expresses is, that the offer made by 
Great Britain could not be acceded to without a re- 
linquishment of our just rights, and the sacrifice 
of the honor of the nation ; and he also 
says that he sees no reason to expect 
that any offer of compromise will be made by Great 
Britain which the United States can accept consist- 
ently with what is due to our rights and honor. This 
may look unfavorable to a settlement by negotia- 
tion; yet it is a very different thing from saying that 
he had changed his ground, and should hereafter in 
siat on our claims to their utmost extent. 

Much stress has been placed on his declaration, 
that he made the offer of the forty-ninth parallel, 
only in deference to what had been done by pre- 
ceding administrations; but the declaration does not 
atop there, for he adds, "and especially in conside- 
ration that propositions of compromise had been 
thrice made by two preceding administrations, to 
adjust the question on the parallel of forty-nine de- 
grees." It is doing great injustice to the President, 
to say, that he made a proposition which he did not 
approve, from mere deference to the opinions of his 
predecessors. This is a very different thing from 
making a proposal for adjustment, in considera- 
tion of what they had done; from a regard to the 
previous acts of the government; and the influence 
they must necessarily have on the question. It was 
the acts of the government, the position it had early 
assumed, and long maintained in this controversy. 
If this consideration, in the judgment of the Presi- 
dent, rendered it proper and right for him to pro- 
pose for the adjustment of this dispute, the same ba- 
sis hia predecessors had assumed, does not the same 
reason continue still, and possess the same force 
now that it did when he made the proposition? 
And having renewed this offer himself, will it not 
be more difficult now for him to insist on a more ex- 
tensive claim on our part, than it would before he 
kad renewed the proposition formerly made.' Has 
. he not, in a measure, tied up his own hands.' If he 
had intended to have insisted on cltiiming the whole 
territory, ought he not to have done so at first, and 
not have weakened such claim, and embarrassed 
himself by renewing the offer to compromise? It 
appeared to him that it was now too late for the 
President to put forward any such claim; and after 
what he has done, he did not see how he could 
do it. 

There is certainly nothing in the declarations of 
the President to show that he had changed, or in- 
tended to change, hia position, or depart from the 



policy of his predecessors, which he seemed to con- 
sider himself bound to respect. And if we look to 
hia acts, to what he has done, or recommended to 
Congress to do, we find nothing there to favor the 
idea that he has changed his ground, and intends 
now to insist upon our rights to their utmost extent, 
regardless of consequences. He recommends giving 
notice to abrogate the convention, the extending the 
laws of the United States over the territory, in res- 
pect to our own citizens, and to the same extent that 
Great Britain has extended her laws over her sub- 
jects. He also recommends the establishment of 
military posts to encourage and protect emigrants 
to the territory, and the establishment of Indian 
agencies west of the Rocky mountains, to preserve 
friendly relations with the Indian tribes, and the 
establishment of a mail to the Oregon territory — all 
of which measures he considers as consistent with 
the treaty, and in no way tending to disturb the 
peaceful relations between the two countries. There 
are no measures recommended that are inconsistent 
with negotiation, or that look to the assertion of our 
rights by force, or the forcible occupation of the 
country in dispute. 

He had endeavored to show what was the true 
position of the Executive, and what ought, in hia 
judgment, to be the position of Congress in regard 
to this controversy. This he deemed very impor- 
tant; he considered it important to the country that 
the true position of the Executive and of Congress 
in respect to this dispute should be known, that the 
public might be enabled to form their own opinions 
as to the probable issue of it. If they know where 
their government stands, they can judge of the prob- 
able result as well as we can. They can make 
some calculations as to the prospect of peace or 
war, which is so essential to the commercial and 
other interests of the country. 

The senator from New Jersey, [Mr. Dayton,] 
not now in his seat, reviewed the negotiations which 
have taken place between the two governments, 
and seemed, if he understood him, to think that our 
own had been in the wrong. He heard this with 
surprise, as he had come to a very different conclu- 
sion; he had supposed that our government had 
been reasonable and forbearing in the assertian of 
its rights, and had, in every attempt at negotiation, 
shown a disposition to make great concessions of 
what we honestly believed to be our just claims, to 
effect an adjustment of this long and perplexing dis- 
pute. What have been our propositions for the 
adjustment of this controversy, and what have been 
those of Great Britain? We have proposed to di- 
vide the territory on the forty-ninth parallel of 
of north latitude, with some priviliges south of that 
line, sometimes greater and sometimes less, in the 
different negotiations. Great Britain has offered, 
substantially, to make the Columbia river the boun- 
dary, and to take all north of that river to herself. 
She has offered us something more in a part of the 
territory, by continuing the forty-ninth parallel to 
the north branch of the Columbia, and following 
that stream to the Columbia, and thence to the Pa- 
cific; and in some of her propositions has offered a 
strip north of the Columbia on the coast, including 
Bulfinch's harbor, and to the straits of Fuca. But 
substantially, her proposition has been the Colum- 
bia. When in the late negotiation here, our govern- 
ment renewed the offer of the forty-ninth parallel, 
with some additional privileges, but not including 
the navigation of the Columbia, it was rejected the 
same day by the British minister here, without sub- 



a 



mitting it to the consideration of his own govern- 
ment. And this was notall: in rejecting it the Brit- 
ish minister adds, "that he hopedf the government 
of the United States would submit some other prop- 
osition more consistent with fairness and the reason- 
able expectations of the British government." Yes, 
sir, the British plenipotentiary indulged the hope 
that our government would offer some proposition 
more consistent with fairness and the just expecta- 
tions of the British government. Well, sir, what 
are the just expectations of the British government' 
With a pretty fair titl« to the whole of it, as we 
think, we have offered to divide the territory, and 
give them about one-half in point of extent, and 
probably quite one-half in value, considering the 
privileges of inland water and navigation; and yet 
we are told that this proposition is deficient in "fair- 
ness," and falls short of the "just expectations of 
the British government." WeU, what offer has the 
British government made as an evidence of its fair- 
ness? It has offered the Columbia river as the 
boundary, taking all north of that river to 
themselves. They propose to take more than 
eight degrees of territory, and leave for us about 
four and a half; or they take two-thirds, and 
allow us one-third. But this is not all; they 
would have Vancouver's island, a valuable part 
of the territory, and the sounds, bays, and 
straits, around it; indeed, all the harbors and navi- 
gable waters north of the Columbia, and it is admit- 
ted, that there are none south of it; so says Captain 
Wilkes, who has has surveyed the coast. We 
should have no harbor, nor navigable waters but 
the Columbia river, and the British would have an 
equal enjoyment of the harbor at the mouth of that 
river and of the river itself. Such seem to be British 
ideas of "fairness," and such the "reasonable expec- 
tations of that government." Verily, this would 
be taking the lion's share. But to form a just esti- 
mate of the reasonableness and fairness of the pro- 
positions which have been made by the two gov- 
ernments, it would be necessary to look to the 
grounds and extent of the title, or claims of each. 
It was not his purpose, as he had already stated, to 
examine the evidence or proofs of the title of either 
party, but he would make a few remarks, as to the 
nature and extent of them. What is the nature and 
extent of the British title or claim? In the different 
negotiations she has not been very consistent, either 
as to the nature or extent of her rights. Sometimes 
she rests her claim on discovery and the laws of na- 
tions, independent of the Nootka convention; at 
others, it is said, all her rights are summed up and 
settled in that convention. She says she has certain 
rights in that territory in common with others, but 
does not define those rights, nor at all times agree as 
to the origin and grounds on which they rest. She 
claims no exclusive rights, no rights of jurisdiction, 
over any part of the territory, and yet she thinks 
it reasonable, that she should have more than two- 
thirds of it. The strongest argument he had seen in 
support of the British title, was from the senator 
from Maine, [Mr. Evans,] he has made a much more 
able argument, in support of her claims, than her 
minister here. He contends that she has rights sus- 
tained by the laws of nations, independent of the 
Nootka convention, and of which that was a mere re- 
cognition. This he denied; he denied that she had 
any rights on the northwest coast, except what may 
may have been derived from that convention, and 
the possession and settlement of the country since, 
and in consequence of that convention, What these 



rights are, and whether they now exist, is another^ 
question. What rights had Great Britain previous 
to that convention? She claims no exclusive rights 
to any part of that coast, but says .she had certain 
rights in common with others. What were these 
rights, and on what grounds did they resL' She has 
sometimes made a feeble attempt to support her as- 
sumed rights, on the ground of discovery and ex- 
ploration; but seems finally to have abandoned that 
argument, as untenable as it clearly is; and now she 
seems to assume the position that the northwest 
coast was an open country, and free to be used for 
the purposes of navigation and trading by any na- , 
tion, or at least by her. She denied that Spain had ; 
the exclusive jurisdiction of that coast, and this ap- 
pears to be the only foundation of the rights she 
set up for herself — with the denial to Spam of ex- 
clusive jurisdiction, she asserts certain rights in 
herself, in common with others, regarding it as an 
open or unappropriated country which any nation 
might use. And in this view of it, she asserts that 
she had rights by national lasv. Now, he should like 
to know, on what principle of public aw, such- 
rights as these were recognised or justified? Is it so 
that by international law, a country can remain 
open and free to the use of all nations like the 
ocean? He knew of no such principle, and was 
sure there was no such principle. It was entirely 
inconsistent with all the principles of national law, 
respecting the acquisition of rights in a new or un- 
settled country. Spain first discovered that coast, 
and she either acquired certain rights by her dis-? . 
coveries, or she did not. If she did, these rights 
were exclusive, and neither Great Britain, nor any . 
other nation could acquire the same rights, unless 
Spain should have forfeited or lost the rights she 
had so acquired. The rights of Spain may not have 
been complete; she may not hf.ve acquired a perfect 
title or jurisdiction to the country; but if she had 
acquired rights there, which might by possession 
and settlement be rendered perfect, and give her ex- 
clusive jurisdiction, then Great Britain nor any 
other nation could not lawfully interfere with her 
rights, and prevent her from consummating her 
title. Whatever rights Spain had were exclusive; 
sqe claimed nothing in common with other nations. 
Did Spain acquire na rights by being the first 
discoverer? If any, what were those rights? 
Did she not acquire an imperfect title;, 
or the right to possess and settle ihe country, and 
thus secure a complete juriedictiojQ over it? What- 
ever rights she had, they were exclusive; and al- 
though her rights may not have amounted to a com- 
plete title, yet, if they secured to her the privilege 
of making them complete by possession and settle- 
ment, then the interference of Great Britain was 
manifestly unlawful, and a violation of the rights 
of Spain; because it prevented her from perfecting 
her title. If Spain acquired anytiiing at all by dis- 
covery, she acquired the right to perfect a title; but 
this right Great Britain defeated, by forcing Spain 
to yield to her certain rights in the country incon- 
sistent with the right of Spai'j ever^ to acquire an 
exclusive title. 

There can be no mistake in this reasoning, unless 
Spain lost the rights she acquired by discovery, by 
lapse of time and neglect to possess and settle the 
country. This she might have done; but what are 
the facts? The southern part of the northwest 
coast was discovered and explored by Spain at an 
early period; but that part now in dispute, or nearly 
all of it, was not discovered and explored by her 



9 



until 1774 and 1775, only five years before the treaty 
of 1790. This period is so short, it cannot be con- 
tended that Spain lost any rights she acquired by 
discovery, by neglect to settle the country. She 
jjiust have a reasonable time, and certainly five years 
could not be an unreasonable one; To have lost 
her rightaby neglect, there must have been such de- 
lay or lapse of time in setthng the country, as to 
have afforded evidence to the world, that she had 
abandoned her rights of discovery, and did not in- 
tend to settle the country and extend her jurisdic- 
tion over it. But instead of this she had constantly 
asserted her claim and jurisdiction over it. 

Sir, the fact is, the convention of Nootka sound 
was extorted by Great Britain from the weakness 
of Spain. Her only right was the seventy ships of 
the hne which were fitted up and prepared for war 
by Mr. Pitt, who applied to Parliament for a grant 
of fifteen millions for that purpose. Great Britain 
was the aggressor in that transaction, and she has 
never had any rights on the northwest coast, except 
what she acquired by the Nootka convention, and 
that was extorted from Spain by the threat of war. 
Whether that convention was now in force, or had 
been abrogated, was a question he did not propose 
to examine. Nor would he inquire into the extent 
of those rights; they certainly v/ere not the rights of 
exclusive jurisdiction to the whole or any part 
of the territory. But whatever they may be, 
they are all the rights she ever possessed, and 
whether these continue now, is, to say the least, 
doubtful. She can have no other rights, unless 
she has acquired them by possession and oc- 
cupation of the country since; tut that conven- 
tion did not admit of either party acquiring rights 
in that way. Perhaps the strongest view of the 
British claim was that she was in possession and 
occupation of a portion of the territory, and assert- 
ing rights there when we acquired the Spanish title. 
Whether rightfully or not, she was there, and as- 
serting a right to be there, when the Spanish title 
came into our possession; and it could not be de- 
nied that we had in some measure acquiesced in her 
assertion of rights. She was in possebsion there, 
and is still in possession, and if not a rightful pos- 
session, it was a sort of title — the lowest grade of 
title. He thought abstractly considered, the Span- 
ish title was good to the whole territory in dispute; 
he thought the senator fiom New York [Mr. Dix] 
had shown this by his very clear exposition of the 
discoveries and settlements upon that coast. The 
senator from New Jersey [Mr. Dayton] seems 
not to think so; he said we must all have seen 
the weak point in the senator's argument; the 
point where the Spanish title seemed to fail. He 
supposed the senator alluded to the most northerly 
Spanish settlement at Nootka sound. But why 
should the rights of Spain end there ? She had dis- 
covered and explored the coast to north of 60°. 
Could she have no rights north of her most north- 
erly settlement ? Did not the discovery of the coast 
with settlements at certain points upon it, give some 
right to the whole coast? But he did not assert the 
right of Spain from settlements, but from discovery 
which gives an inchoate or imperfect right, which 
may be made perfect by being followed up by set- 
tlement. 

Sir, in any view which can be taken of the Brit- 
ish title, it rests on a doubtful and frail foundation, 
and is limited in its nature and extent. It does not 
rise to the importance or dignity of eminent domiin 
or exclusive jurisdiction. 

How much stronger and more substantial is the 



title of the United States, and how different in its 
nature and extent! We have the Spanish title to the 
whole territory; and to the 49th parallel, we have 
the rights of discovery, Exploration and settlement, 
giving us a complete title as against Great Britain, 
and good against the whole world since have acqui* 
red the Spanish title. In addition to this we have 
the title of France, acquired by the cession of Louis- 
iana in 1803, which secured to us the advantages of 
the tenth article of the treaty of Utrecht, which pro- 
vided for establishing a line or boundary betweeQ 
the French and British possessions in America. 
Under that article the forty-ninth parallel is sup^ 
posed to have been established as the boundary be- 
tween the possessions of the two countries, extend- 
ing west indefinitely. Nor does it seem to be mate-^ 
rial whether the line was actually run or not, if it 
was established by commissioners. 

In addition to all this, we have the right pertain- 
ing to contiguity. The United States bound on this, 
part of the territory in dispute; and in the absence 
of any well established title in any other power, this 
gives us a claim to the territory, as being convenient 
to us, and more important to us than to any other 
nation. This is not a claim against a valid title, but 
like the right of discovery, it is aground of claim — 
it is a reason why we shall have the territory in pref- 
erence to any other nation. And is there not force 
in this reason? Is not this country important to us, 
more than to Great Britain, or any other power— 
at least to the present northern boundary of the 
United States? Is it not important that our posses- 
sions should extend across the continent from ocean 
to ocean? And is it not also important that a for- 
eign power should not establish itself on our border 
on the Pacific, and cut us off from that ocean, and. 
deprive us from all access to it? Would not this add 
to the exposure of our western and northern fron- 
tiers in case of war? 

In questions of this kind in relation to disputed 
territory, where no nation has an undisputed title, 
but two or more may have claims or imperfect titles, 
their respective claims are not to be adjusted solely 
with reference to their respective pretensionij, or as- 
sertion of rights, but in part by considerations of 
their wants, necessities, and conveniences. Re- 
gard should be had to the relation in which they 
stand to the disputed territory, and its importance 
for security, defence, or occupation. A territory 
may be very desirable to one country, and of little 
importance to another. And how do the partifes 
stand in relation to this disputed territory ? It 
adjoins us; it is a part of this continent — 
a part of our country ; the discovery of the 
South Pass, and others, has removed the barrier 
which the Rocky mountains were supposed t,6 
interpose, and opened our country t» the Pacific- 
which has become its natursil boundary on the weSt. 
A great country, such as the United States is des- 
tined to be, can have no other natural limits than 
from sea to sea — from the Atlantic to the Pacifies! 
And, in regard to Great Britain, she is twenty thou- 
sand miles from the northwest coast; her posses^- 
sions in America, it is true, border on a part of this 
disputed territory; but contiguity to a remote colony 
is a different thing from contiguity to the heme pos- 
sessions of any country. To want a territory for 
distant colonization is very different from wanting it ■ 
for the natural extension and enlargement of a 
country adjoining it. These views are not only 
founded in justice and common sense, but are re* 
cognised and sanctioned by the laws of nations. 

Mr. President, what must be thought of the prop 



19 



ositions of the two governments for the adjustment 
of this dispute, when viewed in connexion 
with the nature and extent of their respective claims? 
Our title to more than half of the disputed ter- 
ritory seems almost unquestionable; besides which, 
we have the Spanish title, covering the whole of it, 
-which is abstractly a fair title. And Great Britain 
hats at best but a defective and disputed title to a 
part of the country. And, from proximity and po- 
sition, our claims are much stronger than hers. Yet, 
Knder these circumstances, she claims two-thirds of 
it, and nearly all the privileges of navigation. And 
when we offer to make about an equal division of 
it, yielding all but the valley of the Columbia, to 
which our title seems clear and almost beyond dis- 
pute, she rejects the offer, and expresses the hope 
that we may make a proposition more consistent 
with fairness, and the just expectations of the Brit- 
ifih government. Which party, in this protracted 
negotiation, has shown the most moderation and 
feirness? Which has shown the most readiness to 
concede, and not to press its claims to their full ex 
tent? Let the world decide! And have we not made 
sufficient concessions? Can we yield more, consist- 
ently with a just and proper regard to our 
rights and the honor of the nation? Must we 
not make a stand somewhere, beyond which we 
cannot yield? He certainly thought so. This was 
not a mere question of property, as some seemed 
to regard it. The national honor certainly was in- 
volved in this controversy; not in the assertion of 
our rights to the whole territory, for we have in all 
jMist negotiations acknowledged Great Britain to 
have certain -'whts; not Jin going to any particular 
parallel of iHU'ude, but in obtaining a just and rea- 
sonable adjusment; an honest and just recognition 
of our rights; a fair and equitable division of the 
territory, if the adjustment is on that basis. This 
is not a question of war or compromise, but a ques- 
tion of reasonable and equitable adjustment, or the 
assertion of our rights by force, should it become 
necessary. However we may value peace, we can- 
not yield everything for so high an object. He 
agreed with the senator from Kentucky, [Mr. Crit- 
tenden,] that the interests of peace were the first 
and highest interests of a nation; but high and dear 
as they are, iliey cannot be maintained by a sacri- 
fice of essential rights, or com|iromising the honor 
of the country. This negotiation is in the hands of 
the Executive; the constitution has placed it there; 
but it is the duty of Congress to sustain him in as- 
serting and maintaining the just rights of the repub- 
lic. Let us not weaken his hands, but strengthen 
them. Let us not undermine his position, or at- 
tempt to force him to assume a new one, but en- 
deavor to strengthen and fortify the position he has 
■taken. All want this controversy settled; but it can 
•only be settled by a fair and equitable adjustment. 
It is the part of wisdom to avoid the extremes of 
-pushing our claims too far, or of showing a dispo- 
■ altion to yield too much. We must take a position 
which is clearly just and reasonable, and stand firm 
and steadfast upon it, regardless of consequences, 
and at every hazard. 

If ppice 13 dear to<is, it should not be less dear to 
Great Britain. And are we alone to be called on to 
make concessions to preserve the peace of the two 
countries? is England to yield nothing? Is she to 
have all she desires, and more tha« she has even a 
pretended title to? If concessions are to be made for 
peace, should they not be mutual? Should not 
Great Britain yield something of her pretensions? 
With the stronger and better title on our part, doeo 



she expect we shall yield all, come to her terms, and 
give her all she hzis the assurance to avk? This can. 
not be; peace cannot be preserved in this way. He 
would not say whether England dared to go into s 
war single-handed for the whole or a part of Oregonj 
but he would say that she dare not hazard a war on 
the extreme claim she has set up to this .territory. 
She dare not take the responsibility of a war on a 
claim so unreasonable and extravagant. She dare 
not encounter the judgment of the civilized world; 
and if we stand firm, not increasing our demands, 
nor evincing a disposition to yield more, he had no 
doubt that England would give way, and that the 
honor of the two countries would be maintained. 

There was another consideration he wished to 
notice. What we may do is scarcely more impor- 
tant than the manner in which it may be done. 
Unanimity in our action is nearly as important as 
what our action may be. Congress should present 
a united and bold front in sustaining the Exec- 
utive in the assertion of our rights. When the 
resolutons of his friend from Michigan, [Mr. 
Cass,] were under consideration, in the few re- 
marks he made upon them them, he took occa- 
sion to urge the importance of unanimity on 
a question connected with our foreign relations; and 
although he did not attribute the result at all to any- 
thing he said, he rejoiced, as he presumed every 
senator did, that the vote was unanimous. The 
same unanimity could not be expected on this ques- 
tion, yet he hoped that we should have a united and 
strong vote in favor of the notice, in some form, and 
he was not very anxious in what form it should 
be passed. 

The Senator from New Jersey [Mr. Dayton] re- 
marked, that there seemed to be a determination on 
this side of the chamber to take an extreme position 
beyond what could be assumed on the other side; that 
if they advanced, we took a position still in advance 
of them, and that it seemed we were disposed to 
drive them to the wall. He hardly knew what the 
senator meant by driving them to the wall, unless 
it was driving them beyond the line which separa- 
ted American from British interests, and forcing 
them on to the British side of that line. If this was 
his meaning, he (Mr. N.) believed he was entirely 
mistaken; he certainly was, so far as he was con- 
cerned, and so far as he knew the feeling on this 
side of the hall. Instead of wishing to drive them 
over that line, he had at times been almost afraid, 
that they might, without such design, reason them- 
selves on the wrong side of the line; and had it 
been in his power, he would have checked their 
advance, instead of pushing them on. He had no 
desire that this question should be used for political 
purposes. It was above being used for any such 
object. 

On the subject of the acquisition of territory, he 
was by no means disposed to excite or encourage a 
restive spirit of national aggrandizement; nor did he 
think it necessary to prescribe limits to the repub- 
lic. On poUtical grounds, he had no fears from the 
mere extension of the confederacy; it would be 
rather strengthened than weakened by that cause. 
But our true policy (he thought) was that which 
had prevailed from the origin of our government — 
not to seek acquisition or show any anxiety on the 
subject; but, as opportunities might occur of adding 
adjoining territory, by peaceful means, to avail our- 
selves of them, when deemed for our advantage. It 
was in this way we had acquired Louisiana, Flor- 
ida, and Texas; and by the same policy he thought 
we could acquire Oregon, or such portion of it, ae 



11 



I. I 



vrouid answer all esaential and important purpoeea 
-we could have in view. He thought, in the acqui- 
sition of territory, we were doing pretty well. We 
last year acquired Texas — a territory said to be suf- 
ficient for five or six States; and if we were to ob 
tain Oregon to 49° only this year, a territory large 
enough for an equal number of States, on the Pa- 
cifiCi he thought it would be doing tolerably well for 
two consecutive years. For his part, he should be 
quite satisfied and content with an advance at this 
rate. Besides, we have perhaps increased the fa- 
cilities of enlarging our possessions, or overcome 
what may have been regarded as an obstacle in the 
way of it. He was about to say what he never had 
said, and perhaps ought not to say. [Mr. Benton — 
let us hear it.] — It was that, in the acquisition 
of Texas as well as of Louisiana, we had perhaps 
stretched the constitution a Iktle. He had al- 
ways believed that there was great diffi- 
culty in accomplishing that object, either by 
treaty or in the form of admission as a State. The 
latter he regarded as most free from difficulty; but 
annexation, if not in theory, was at least in practice, 
a new principle; and it was certainly a very com- 
prehensive one, if it is to have that scope which was 
given to it, by two ofthe most distinguished advocates 
of the measure on this side of the chamber, now no 
longer here. In saying this, he must except his friend 
■from Missouri, [Mr Benton,] who he held to be first 
of American statesmen. The principle of annexa- 
tion, as defended and sustained by the gentleman al- 
luded to, was extremely broad; indeed without lim- 
itation; it would take into our confederacy, England, 
China, and the whole world. Such was not his 
construction of that article of the constitution; it 
WM too loose, and latitudinarian for him. But with 
any restriction, that can be given to it, annexation 
■was a broad and comprehensive principle; it would 
admit of any convenient extension of our confeder- 
acy. The acquisition of Texas, he regarded as an 
important object, and with difficulty brought his 
mind to vote for it; and]that addition to our family of 
States he sincerely hoped, would not prove to have 
Ijecn accomplished by a Caesarian operation. The 
extent of the principle all must admit, but its influ- 
ence on our system, whether safe or dangerous, 
time only could determine. He hoped it might not 
have the effect of some of the innovations upon 
the institutions of ancient Rome, as that of confer- 
ring on the people of the neighboring cities of 
Italy, the same privileges as were enjoyed by the 
•ciu'zens of Rome. But annexation was a conveni- 
ent and efficient principle for extending the iimits of 
<fae republic; it might be applied to Mexico and the 
whole continent. Mexico was falling to pieces; the 
■northern provinces might seek the security and pro- 
tection of our Union, and apply for admission. 
Already has Yucatan seemed disposed to apply for 
admission into our confederacy, and to seek the 
protection of the United States against Mexican 
•ilaisrule and oppression. She is a little too remote 
for our purposes; but California which liad a more 
■favorable position seemed already to be coveted by 
some of our citizens. The example of Texas may 
have a more extensive influence than any one i*i 
■now aware of, on the whole, or at least ail the 
northern provinces of Mexico. This probable union 
of Mexico with the United States is beginning to 
be discussed there, and when the advantages of our 
Union are better understood, they may come to the 
conclusion that a union with us is the only resourci' 
against rcijpruie and. anarchy. We shall have no 



difficulty in enlargiag our poMessions, and the ques- 
tion with us, should rather be, what we will accept, 
than what we can acquire? He hoped, at any 
rate, that we should be satisfied with the principle 
of annexation, and should not seek to extend our 
limits, by another prmciple, more ancient, but more 
dangerous, that of conquest. 

That was one objection he had to settling our 
claims to Oregon by force; as that might have, at 
least, the appeetrance of conquest. We assert a right 
to it, but history proves, that all cases of conquest, 
have been accompanied by the assertion of a right of 
some sort. He hoped never to see territory added 
to our republic by conquest or force. 

Sir, the foreign relations of our country are assum- 
ing a new, and, perhaps, somewhat critical aspect. 
Inour difliculties v/ith foreign powers, heretofore, 
we have been regarded as a young and compara- 
tively feeble nation, which has secured to us, the 
sympathies, and in one instance the aid, and co-op- 
eration of other powers. They had faith in our 
justice, and the moderation of our demands. Now, 
our condition is changed; we are regarded as one of 
the great powers of the earth; and although possess- 
ing an extent of territory enjoyed by few nations in 
ancient or modern times; we are suspected, yes, ac- 
cused of coveting more, and of being influenced by a 
spirit of territorial aggrandizement. And can it be 
said, that we have given no occasion to this imputa- 
tion ? He did not allude to Oregon. But do we not 
hear suggestions about acquiring California, and 
even Cuba, during the very time that we were adopt- 
ing meeisures to secure Texas and Oregon? A spirit 
of jealousy is rising up against us, and it behoovea 
us to act with some caution, as well as moderation, 
firmness and steadiness in our policy. We should 
appreciate the true and certain destiny of our coun- 
try; its certain greatness; in extent, in population, in 
physical resources, in the energy of our people, the 
offspring of free institutions, and in all the elements 
of national power. What occasion have we to feel 
any solicitude about the acquisition of more territory? 
With natural resources superior to any other nation, 
and enjoying a prosperity surpassing all others, all 
that can be wanting is, a continuance of peace to en- 
able us soon to reach thatelevatedrankinthescaleof 
nations, that greatness which is our ultimate destiny. 

But while this controversy remains unsettled, a 
cloud must hang over our country, which all must 
desire to see removed, and which had become the 
highest diity ofthe government. 

In conclusion, Mr. President, (said Mr. N.,) he 
would say to the American Senate and to the coun- 
try that with this portentous cloud hanging over us, 
we should have hope and faith — abiding and unsha- 
ken faith — m our !i;overnnient, in the Executive as 
well as in Congress; faith in the justice of our 
cause; faith in the patriotism of our people: faith in 
the people of England, not m their government; in 
their sense of justice, and love of peace; and above 
all, faith in a just and overruling Providencie, who 
hath declared that "the race is not to the swift, nor 
the battle to the strong." With this abiding faith, 
and conscious of the justice af our cau^se, let us all — 
whether as private citizens or as connected with the 
administration ofthe government — fearlessly do our 
duty to maintai.i the rights and honor of our coun- 
try, leaving the issue to that Almighty power which 
has so long protected and blessed our beloved coun- 
try, which holds in its hands the destinies of na- 
tions, and "turneih the hearts of men and of kings 
aa the rivers are tamed." 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 



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